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combatants,” with both the protections
and restraints implied, and that PMCs,
along with the state governments, have
a shared responsibility to conduct the
war in a way that is consistent with
command and control accountability.
Outsourcing War is a compelling analysis
of the reemergence of nonstate actors
in the implementation of warfare.
With scholarly credibility and political
savvy, Eckert displays an understanding of both the past and the present
as the just war tradition impacts the
future development of PMCs, offering
reasonable solutions to the current
problems posed by the outsourcing of
war. In applying the jus ad bellum and
jus in bello modifications to the status
and conduct of PMCs, Eckert’s central
assertion in Outsourcing War makes us
wonder whether these modifications
negate the very reasons for using
PMCs in the first place. This question
raises even further the critical issue of
whether it is more important to alter
PMC practices to align with just war
principles or to alter just war principles
to align with PMC practices. Eckert
seems to advocate a middle course that
balances the time-honored principles
of the just war tradition with the
reality of contemporary PMC practices
through responsible applications, and
that balance is one for policy makers,
academics, and warfighters to debate
in the outsourcing of war to PMCs.
EDWARD ERWIN

Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the
Great Campaigns, by John T. Kuehn. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015. 249 pages. $60.
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John Kuehn’s objective is to analyze the
Napoleonic Wars “along principally
operational lines” (p. xi). Kuehn claims
that, of the three levels of war, “the
one that is least understood and
written about resides in that always
uncomfortable middle ground, the
operational level” (p. x). He explains
that he chose the period of the French
Wars (1792–1815) because they lend
themselves “particularly well to an
operational-level analysis” (p. ix). His
goal is to provide “something of an
impressionistic result that suggests the
operational-level approach adopted here
illustrates effectively the more esoteric
concept of operational art—how military
genius, as best defined by Clausewitz,
operated in space and time in the uncertain environment at the operational
level during the era of a veritable ‘God of
War’” (p. xi). In particular, Kuehn, who
holds the General William Stofft Chair
for Historical Research at the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College,
maintains that “an operational examination of Napoleonic campaigns has value
because so many of their characteristics
resemble current American military
thought and practice” (p. 9).
The book begins with an interesting
discussion of the evolution of the
operational art as a level of war to be
studied. Kuehn provides definitions
and an explanation of his methodology,
which is to analyze Napoleonic operations through the frameworks provided
by the Soviet school and by James
Schneider, formerly of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College.
Successive chapters generally follow the
chronology of the coalition wars that
France fought between 1792 and 1815.
Chapter 3, which covers the War of the
Second Coalition, examines Russian and
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French operations in Italy and Switzerland but does not include Napoleon’s
second Italian campaign. Chapter 4 is
devoted to an interesting study of the
naval war between Great Britain and
France, in particular the operational
art of Admiral Horatio Nelson, which
is well done. Kuehn concludes his book
with a very short epilogue that covers
Napoleon’s last campaigns in 1814 and
1815. No bibliography is included.
Professor Kuehn makes it very clear that
his conclusions are not based on archival
research or a fresh look at the primary
sources: “[M]ost of the sources used for
this book are secondary and may appear
dated with respect to their interpretations. They are used to get basic facts,
which at the operational level of war
are largely established” (p. xi). His notes
demonstrate a heavy dependence on David Chandler, John Elting, Steven Ross,
Christopher Duffy, Rory Muir, Gunther
Rothenberg, and Charles Oman. One
curious omission is the works on 1806,
1807, 1809, 1813, and 1814 by the earlynineteenth-century British staff officer
Francis Loraine Petre, who provides
much better operational studies than
does Chandler. Moreover, only a handful
of references were drawn from recent
scholarship by Roger Knight and Alexander Mikaberidze. Completely missing
from Kuehn’s notes are Huw Davies’s
groundbreaking 2012 work Wellington’s
Wars: The Making of a Military Genius,
which might have persuaded Kuehn that
his interpretation of Wellington’s way of
war needed some revision, and John H.
Gill’s three volumes on 1809, Thunder
on the Danube. Conversely, Kuehn
consulted Gneisenau’s life of Blücher,
which must be used with extreme
caution because at times it borders
on fiction. For example, the Krümper
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system did not produce 150,000
trained men in three years (p. 175).
The problem with Professor Kuehn’s
research is that the “basic facts” these
dated works provide are the material
from which he draws his conclusions,
and they are not always accurate.
Moreover, the work is replete with
generalizations and oversimplifications
that likewise are not always accurate.
For example, Yorck did not conduct
“extensive negotiations” with Clausewitz
in December 1813 (p. 174) but with the
Russian general Diebitsch; Germany did
not explode in revolt in early 1813 (p.
179); and the “ubiquitous Czernicheff
and his Cossacks” were not responsible
for the destruction of Girard’s division
on August 27, 1813 (p. 195)—that was
the work of Prussian general Hirschfeld’s
mainly Landwehr (militia) brigade of
twelve thousand men, supported by
Czernicheff ’s five Cossack regiments,
at the battle of Hagelberg. Blücher’s
army in 1815 was not “a veritable
Prussian Grande Armée” (p. 209), as
it lacked any reserves or specialized
units at the army level, and 75 percent
of one of its four corps consisted of
newly raised Landwehr, while another
corps was 50 percent Landwehr.
This reviewer had hoped that with
ABC-CLIO’s acquisition of Praeger
some quality-control measures would
be introduced to the latter’s publishing
process; sadly, this has not been the case.
Although no fault of his, Kuehn’s book is
in dire need of professional copyediting.
Misspellings, omissions and commissions in punctuation and capitalization,
missing diacritical marks and nobiliary
particles, redundant vocabulary, and
less-than-clear sentences mar this book.
Kuehn is not entirely blameless. Minor
yet irritating errors such as “the army of

2

8/7/17 11:58 AM

154

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Leggiere and Kuehn: Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns

Prussia created by Frederick the Great
and his father Frederick William II” (p.
16) undermine the author’s credibility.
Austria’s Hofkriegsrat was not “also
known as the Aulic Council” (p. 24);
they were very different entities.
Maps are an issue as well. The maps in
this book would have been considered
archaic fifty years ago; today they are
abominable and practically illegible—
a magnifying glass might be of some
assistance. Any operational study
depends on good maps to help the
reader understand the course of the
campaigns, but this reviewer gave up
on trying to use this book’s maps.
It is difficult to state where this book
fits in the massive literature on the
Napoleonic Wars. This study can be seen
as an extension of Robert M. Epstein’s
1994 work Napoleon’s Last Victory and
the Emergence of Modern War. Kuehn
does accomplish his stated goal of
describing the Napoleonic “campaigns,
armies, and leaders using the lens of
operational art” (p. 10). However, the
descriptions of the campaigns are not
detailed enough for any but a Napoleonic Wars expert to grasp the points that
Kuehn is trying to make. He admits that
some will object to his use of twentiethcentury military theory to explain
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
events (p. xi). Kuehn does have moments
of brilliance, especially in the chapters
on the evolution of the operational art
and the naval duel, as well as the short
paragraphs he employs to summarize
his chapters, but in the end an analysis
based on outdated scholarship provides
a weak foundation that jeopardizes
the stability of the entire structure.
MICHAEL V. LEGGIERE

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 14

Hunters and Killers, by Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman. Vol. 2, Anti-submarine Warfare
from 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2016. 272 pages. $49.95.

Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is
the second volume in a comprehensive
history of the impact of the submarine
on maritime warfare. Engaging their
significant expertise in the history of
naval warfare and military technology
research and development, authors
Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman chronicle the development and
employment of the submarine as a
weapon of war at sea and the resulting response by navies to counter
the effectiveness of the submarine
through antisubmarine warfare (ASW).
This book examines submarine and
antisubmarine technology, tactics, and
doctrine chronologically, commencing
with World War II submarine operations
in the Atlantic and Pacific and culminating with twenty-first-century ASW
concepts and contemporary issues.
This history captures the asymmetry
between the submarine and antisubmarine warfare as these two forms of
maritime warfare competed for tactical
and operational superiority. The book
discusses contributions the science and
technology community made to ASW,
as well as the actions of operational
and tactical innovators. The scientists
and innovators collectively developed
ASW capabilities that reignited further
competition between the submarine
and the ASW operator. The book’s
chronological approach studies the
pace and trajectory of evolutionary and
revolutionary changes in submarine
operations and antisubmarine warfare by
explaining the tactical and operational
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